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Part One 
Introduction
This document is submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
terms of deliverable D5 under the contract for the World Bank 
funded project TOR 2.
An earlier version of this report was submitted in July 1993 
to assist the effort by a team headed by Director Anatol Szurmak 
in the Polish National Labor Office which prepared a draft 
unemployment insurance (UI) law submitted to the Polish 
parliament in the Autumn of 1993.
In November 1995 there remained interest in reforming the UI 
system in Poland. At that time Director Irina Wolenska of the 
Polish National Labor Center requested that a revision of my July 
1993 proposal be prepared, with the emphasis in the revision 
being the financing system. To that end, an entirely new part 
has been added to this report.
After the introduction, this document includes four parts. 
The next part gives background information, which provides a 
brief summary of the economic and administrative context in which 
a UI law would be introduced in Poland. The third part presents 
the proposed rules for a UI system for Poland. The attempt was 
to present these rules as clearly as possible; no attempt was 
made to state the rules in a legalistic style. So as to clearly 
illustrate the proposed rules, in many cases explicit formulae or 
parameters are given in the proposed rules. The fourth part of 
this document is an analysis of the suggested rules for a UI 
system for Poland. The analysis considers each important feature 
in the sequence in which it appears in the suggested law. The 
fifth and final part presents detailed discussion of alternative 
financing schemes for UI together with a set of simulation 
results to illustrate how these systems work.
Part Two 
Background
For this part of the TOR 2 project, the task presented to 
the Upjohn Institute was to draft rules for an unemployment 
insurance (UI) system which included a financing mechanism. The 
Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy hoped that the 
financing system would operate on a trust fund basis and tend 
toward solvency over the business cycle. During April, 1993 the 
Poles accepted the argument that for the UI system to have a 
chance at solvency, it should be used to pay for only UI benefits 
and not active labor policy (ALP) measures such as retraining and 
intervention works. The Institute argued that ALPs should be 
paid for out of general revenues on a discretionary basis.
Currently a 3% tax is levied on total payrolls to fund 
employment programs. The tax is paid by employers. Taxes 
collected by this mechanism amount to only about 40% of all 
benefits currently paid out. With the severe unemployment 
situation in Poland, about 95% of all expenditures on labor 
market programs are for unemployment compensation (only 5% goes 
to ALPs). Also because of the situation, there is a fixed 
benefit amount, equal to 36% of the average national wage (it 
amounts to about USD 80), paid each month to eligible 
beneficiaries. There is also a 45% social insurance tax which is 
to be paid by employers on total wages; the National Labor Office 
(NLO) is required to pay this for unemployment compensation 
beneficiaries. In practice this tax is not being paid now 
because of the financial difficulties. Furthermore, there is a 
progressive income tax system. The lowest rate of 20% applies to 
UC beneficiaries, and again because of financial problems this 
withholding is generally not transferred from the NLO to the tax 
authority.
There is a widespread problem in Poland which is referred to 
as "Black Labor." In the United States this type of employment 
is said to be part of "the underground economy." Many people, 
including UC recipients, have jobs on which they are paid cash 
under-the-table. While this phenomenon is probably more due to 
the 45% social insurance tax than the 3% employment tax, the 
Poles world be interested in a UI law which recognizes this and 
attempts to deal with it.
There are 49 voivods (states) in Poland. Currently labor 
market programs operate under national laws with nationally 
provided funding. Naturally, the programs are administered and 
monitored at the voivod and local levels.
In Warsaw, during a March, 1993 trip some preliminary ideas 
about features to be included in a new UI law for Poland. The 
following were received with interest:
(1) Separate the UI system from active labor market programs 
(ALPs). UI benefits should be an entitlement for persons 
with a work history and continuing labor force attachment  
it is a passive measure of labor market policy. UI should 
be paid for from special tax revenues which are held in a UI 
trust fund. UI is the first line of defense against 
unemployment and the payment of benefits should be 
guaranteed by a promise to make loans from general revenues 
if needed. ALPs should be operated as discretionary 
programs which are paid for out of general governmental 
revenues with the design and funding level changed 
periodically to depending on economic and political 
conditions.
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(2) The current UC program contains elements of both social
welfare and UI. These must be separated. For example, if 
social policy calls for maternity benefits, they should be 
paid from the social welfare fund not from the UI fund. 
Also, eligibility for UI benefits should not be based on the 
current income of the spouse or other household members.
(3) A required waiting period (perhaps two weeks long) might be 
included at the beginning of the period of compensable 
unemployment. This acts as a kind of co-payment by the 
benefit recipient. It may greatly reduce benefit payments, 
and reduces compensation when need is the least and other 
sources of income are less likely to be exhausted at the 
beginning of a spell of unemployment.
(4) Provisions to reduce "black labor" should be considered.
These might include use of "experience rating of UI taxes" 
to encourage employers to increase their reporting of wages, 
an incentive for workers to want earnings reported in order 
to qualify for UI benefits, and a "partial benefits" 
schedule to encourage part time work with reporting of 
earnings by the worker.
(5) The current system for benefit denials must be stated more 
clearly. That is, the conditions for denial and the period 
of denial, temporary or permanent, must be clearly stated 
for as many objective cases as possible.
(6) Provisions for "work sharing," which is popular in the 
German UI system, might also be considered.
Among the above points, item (4) having to do with 
experience rating an partial benefits raised the most questions 
from the Polish side. Details about these points are given in 
what follows.
Among members of the Steering Committee for TOR 2, Director 
Olejarz guidance regarding preparation of a proposed UI system 
for Poland was the most substantive. His opinion was that the 
Upjohn Institute should propose some explicit design for a system 
including a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the 
various parts of the system, and that the presentation should 
include a description of the role of the institutions involved. 
Director Olejarz suggested that, in order to avoid creating new 
institutions, the UI Fund should be operated by labor offices. 
He asked that the role of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 
and the National Labor Office as well as well as voivod and local 
labor offices to be described in the proposal. The content and 
style of presentation of what follows is in accordance with the 
request of Director Olejarz.
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Part Three 
Proposed Rules for An Unemployment Insurance System for Poland
I. Objectives of Unemployment Insurance
A. Temporary partial wage replacement during periods of 
involuntary unemployment to reduce hardship;
B. Minimize the duration of unemployment by promoting 
rapid and suitable reemployment;
C. Limit economic downturns by supporting consumer
purchasing power in the community and nation;
D. Encourage stabilization of employment within 
enterprises.
II. Coverage
Coverage under this act must be provided to all employees by 
all employers who have a total annual payroll which equals or 
exceeds six times the average monthly wage in Poland. For 
purposes of this act employment is defined as service performed 
for an employer for compensation subject to the following 
exclusions:
A. Self employed persons; 
B. Employees of churches;
C. Services provided by children or the spouse of an owner 
of an enterprise;
D. Services provided by individuals who are principally 
compensated on a commission basis;
E. Services provided by persons who are primarily 
students;
F. Employees of a custodial or penal institution while 
resident;
G. Publicly elected officials;
H. Services provided under work-relief or work-training 
programs.
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III. Eligibility for Benefits
A. Monetary Eligibility: Required Work Experience
Eligibility for benefits depends on employment during the 
base period. The base period is defined as the first four of the 
last 5 completed calendar quarters. Total earnings during the 
base period must be at least 3 times the average monthly wage in 
Poland. Total earnings must also be at least 150 percent of 
earnings in the calendar quarter of the base period with the 
highest earnings.
B. Non-monetary Eligibility: Separation Issues
Disqualification for benefits will result for employees who 
have been separated from their previous employer for the 
following reasons:
1. Discharged for misconduct involving a wilful 
or wanton disregard of an employer's 
interests. Under this section misconduct is 
meant to include but not be limited to theft, 
excessive unexcused absences, destruction of 
property, assault and battery;
2. Discharged for intoxication while at work due to 
alcohol or other controlled substances;
3. Voluntary leaving of employment unless for a
compelling reason such as sexual harassment or 
work place safety;
4. A strike or lockout associated with a labor 
dispute where the compensation and other 
conditions of employment are directly 
determined by the collective bargaining 
agreement being disputed.
The burden of proving eligibility differs between situations 
of voluntary leaving and dismissal for misconduct. To be 
qualified in a situation involving voluntary leaving, the worker 
must show that there was "good cause" for leaving due to actions 
of the employer, for example, sexual harassment or work place 
safety. To be disqualified for misconduct the employer must show 
evidence of an intentional disregard of the employer's interests 
on the part of the worker, for example theft or vandalism.
An individual who has been disqualified because of a 
separation issue may establish eligibility for benefit payment to 
begin under the following conditions:
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1. Fulfills all other conditions for benefit eligibility
in each of three separate months in the cases mentioned 
in points III.B.I, III.B.2, and III.B.3.
2. The strike or lockout associated with a labor dispute 
has ended.
C. Initial Eligibility Determination
Every application for benefits shall be reviewed by an 
eligibility examiner at the Local Labor Office (LLO) where the 
application for benefits was first made. An eligibility examiner 
is a clerk who does not necessarily have formal legal training, 
but has a complete understanding of the UI law. The eligibility 
examination clerk makes an initial eligibility determination, 
based on information given in the initial application for 
benefits and supplemental information provided by the previous 
employer. Written copies of the initial eligibility 
determination are sent to both the claimant and the previous 
employer. Any appeal of the initial eligibility determination by 
an employer or claimant must be made in writing within 30 days of 
the initial eligibility determination.
D. Continuing Eligibility Criteria
For claimants who have the required work experience and are 
not disqualified because of the circumstances of separation from 
their employer, benefits will be paid if the following continuing 
eligibility criteria are satisfied:
1. The claimant must be able to work. That is, 
the claimant possesses both the physical and 
mental capacity to perform their customary 
work;
2. The claimant must be available for work. 
That is, ready and willing to report to 
suitable work which will be scheduled during 
customary hours for the claimant's 
occupation;
3. The claimant must be actively seeking work. 
That is, actively trying to gain full time 
regular employment using all means 
appropriate for the claimant's occupation;
4. The claimant must register with the public 
placement service and participate in any 
employment interviews for suitable work 
arranged by the public placement service;
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5. The claimant may not refuse suitable work. 
Work offered to a claimant will be deemed 
suitable if it satisfies the following 
conditions:
a. The work does not involve excessive risk 
or hazard to health, safety, or morals;
b. The physical demands of the work do not 
exceed the claimant's abilities;
c. The work is consistent with the 
claimant's prior training, work 
experience, and earnings level;
d. Round trip travel between home and a 
work place where a job is available, 
does not exceed regional norms (usually 
less than a total of three hours per 
day) using customary means of transport.
The range of what constitutes suitable work will be 
broadened as:
i. Reemployment prospects in the 
customary occupation decline;
ii. A claimant's duration of 
unemployment lengthens.
An individual who fails to satisfy continuing eligibility 
criteria III.D.I or III.D.2 for certain days in a given month 
will lose eligibility to benefits for those days.
An individual who fails to satisfy continuing eligibility 
criteria III.D.3 on any day during the month on which he is able 
and available for work will lose eligibility to benefits for that 
month.
An individual who fails to satisfy continuing eligibility 
criteria III.D.4 in a given month will lose eligibility to 
benefits for that month.
An individual who fails to satisfy continuing eligibility 
criteria III.D.5 in a given month will lose eligibility to 
benefits for that month and for the next month during which all 
eligibility criteria are met.
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E. Employer and Claimant Appeals of Eligibility Decisions
If either a claimant or a previous employer disagrees with 
an eligibility decision made by an official, an appeal may be 
filed. The appeal must be in written form and must be filed, 
within 30 days of the decision being appealed, with an official 
in a local office. There shall be three levels of decision 
making for benefit eligibility appeals. Written request must be 
filed to proceed to the next level in each case.
Level 1 - is the local level where decisions are issued by 
eligibility examiners who are clerks. They do not necessarily 
have formal legal training, but do have a complete understanding 
of the UI law.
Level 2 - is the voivod level where decisions are issued 
following administrative hearings conducted by administrative law 
judges who have formal legal training.
Level 3 - is the national level where final non-appealable 
decisions are issued following administrative hearings conducted 
by a panel of federal administrative law judges who have formal 
legal training. This panel is called the "Board of Review."
The eligibility appeal process may include up to three 
decisions following the initial eligibility determination. It 
shall be conducted as follows:
Decision 1 - is made at level 1 in the local office. The 
decision on an appeal shall be made by a different eligibility 
clerk than the one who made the initial eligibility decision. 
The decision may or may not involve new information provided by 
the employer and the claimant involved in a separation. Any 
appeal of this decision by an employer or claimant must be made 
in writing within 30 days of the decision.
Decision 2 - this level involves oral testimony and written 
evidence from both sides. If a claimant or employer requests 
assistance in preparing or attending an appeal hearing, an 
advocate shall be provided. Any appeal of this decision by an 
employer or claimant must be made in writing within 30 days of 
the decision.
Decision 3 - this level rarely involves new oral or written 
testimony. The standard procedure is simply to review the record 
from Decision 2. Usually, new information is only added at this 
level if it was unavailable at the time of the level 2 hearing. 
The decision of the "Board of Review" made at this level is 
final there is no possibility of appeal.
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IV. Benefits
Once an individual is determined to be eligible for 
benefits, that individual can receive the benefit payments during 
the 12 month period which begins on the day from which benefit 
eligibility is established. This 12 month period is referred to 
as the benefit year.
A. Monthly Benefit Amount
The monthly benefit amount (MBA) to be paid to eligible 
claimants shall be one-sixth (1/6) of the claimant's high quarter 
earnings. The following limitations on the MBA apply:
1. In no case shall the MBA exceed fifty percent 
of the average monthly wage in Poland;
2. In no case shall the MBA be less than ten 
percent of the average monthly wage in 
Poland.
B. Mandatory Non-compensable Period of Unemployment
Following the date of filing, there shall be a two week (14 
calendar days) period for which benefits will not be payable. In 
order for days of unemployment to be compensable after the two 
week period, all conditions for benefit eligibility must be 
satisfied during the two week non-compensable period.
Claimants who become reemployed on a new full-time job (not 
a recall to the previous job), which is not subsidized by the 
state, within 2 months of filing for benefits while unemployed, 
may be paid an amount equal to their MBA as an incentive for 
early return to work. The reemployment incentive payment can 
only be made once during a benefit year, and if it is paid will 
be deducted from the total value of their benefit entitlement.
C. Duration of Benefits
The total amount of payments available during a benefit year 
is limited to one-half of total base period earnings or 12 times 
the maximum MBA which ever is lower. The maximum duration of 
benefits is the total amount of payments available divided by the 
MBA or 12 months which ever is shorter.
D. Benefits for Partial Unemployment
To provide an incentive for beneficiaries to work at least 
part time, in figuring the MBA for claimants who are working part 
time earnings up to 10% of the average monthly wage in Poland 
shall be disregarded, but the MBA shall be reduced by 50% of all 
earnings in excess of the disregard.
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E. Reduction in Benefits Due to Pension Receipt
Individuals receiving pension benefits during a month of 
unemployment during which they are otherwise eligible for 
unemployment benefits, will have their monthly benefit reduced by 
the amount of pension income received in that month.
V. Financing
A. Benefit Financing
1. Benefit Trust Fund
A Benefit Trust Fund will be established to provide for the 
payment of unemployment benefits. Employers will pay taxes to 
support the costs of those benefits. The Benefit Trust Fund will 
be administered by the National Labor Office.
The Benefit Trust Fund must be able to meet three separate 
objectives: (1) paying current unemployment benefit costs, (2) 
accumulating reserves for future benefits, and (3) supporting the 
costs of certain additional benefits during periods of high 
unemployment.
In addition, there must be a mechanism to ensure the 
continued payment of benefits from other resources if the Benefit 
Trust Fund temporarily becomes insolvent.
2. Benefit Funding Mechanism
The system of financing unemployment benefit costs is based 
on the principal of experience-rating. Under complete experience 
rating, each employer is responsible for the cost of unemployment 
benefits paid to former employees. A high degree of experience- 
rating means that a layoff results in higher direct future 
unemployment tax rates. Conversely, employers with stable 
employment histories receive a direct monetary incentive to 
provide stable employment: lower tax rates. More generally, 
experience rating leads to employer involvement in the 
administration of UI, resulting in a generally more efficient 
system.
In order to operate a UI tax system based on experience 
rating, a separate reserve account must be maintained for each 
employer. To maintain these separate records of each employer's 
experience, the National Labor Office will assign every employer 
a unique identification number to be used to maintain individual 
employer reserve account information. The National Labor Office 
will maintain records of all benefit charges according to the 
claimant's name, identification number and the employer to which
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the unemployment benefits are to be charged. The benefit charges 
are the basis for calculating an employer's future tax rate.
At the end of each calendar quarter, the employer will 
receive a summary statement showing the amount of unemployment 
benefits paid to each former employee. These benefit charges, 
are used to determine the total benefits charged to the 
employer's reserve account. The benefit charges reflect all 
benefits paid to former employee's, except for the benefits that 
are socialized to all employers for example voluntary quit 
requalifications.
Once an experience rating tax system is established, tax and 
benefit information from four calendar quarters (perhaps one 
calendar year) is used to establish future tax rates. This 
period of time is referred to as the "computation period." The 
employer's reserve account balance will be calculated based on 
data collected for the "computation period" and reported to the 
employer annually.
All taxes paid by an employer will be credited to that 
employer's reserve account and all benefits paid to former 
employees will be charged to that employer's reserve account. An 
employer who has paid more taxes than former employees have 
collected in unemployment benefits is referred to as a "positive 
balance" employer. Generally, "positive balance" employers have 
favorable experience and are rewarded with low unemployment tax 
rates. Alternately, an employer that has paid less in 
unemployment tax than former employees have received in benefits 
is known for purposes of experience-rating as a "negative 
balance" employer. Negative balance employers will be assigned 
higher unemployment tax rates to reflect their direct 
unemployment costs. However, there will be limits as to how high 
a negative balance employer's tax rate can go.
It is important to note that an employer's reserve account will 
only be used to calculate the experience of the individual firm. 
It does not become a direct asset or liability which should 
appear on the firm's balance sheet. It only relates to future 
unemployment tax rates.
The calculation of an employer's tax rate will be determined 
on the basis of a "reserve-ratio system." This means that the 
individual employer's reserve account balance will be the primary 
factor in assigning the employer's individual tax rate. The 
individual employer's tax rate will be calculated by dividing the 
employer's reserve account balance by their total wages paid in 
the computation period and referring to a tax schedule. 
Depending on the condition of the overall benefit trust fund, 
different tax schedules will be used. However, the rate 
schedules should also factor in the socialized benefit costs. 
The socialized tax is a small flat tax that every employer pays
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to support the costs of benefits which cannot be charged to a 
particular employer's reserve account. Socialized benefit 
charges include all benefits paid to claimants who are 
disqualified for separation reasons but later requalify as 
stated in Section III.B. Also included in socialized benefit 
charges are benefits paid to former employees of bankrupt or 
closed firms.
Unemployment taxes will be paid quarterly with the tax 
payment due determined by multiplying the employer's tax rate by 
all payrolls for that quarter. A report showing the wages paid 
to each employee and the taxes payable will be forwarded to the 
National Labor Office's tax collection authority. Failure to 
submit required taxes will result in additional interest and 
penalties.
Before an employer's UI tax rate can be fully based on 
experience-rating, it is necessary to start at a uniform tax rate 
and then gradually phase in the experience over time. In order 
to develop an adequate history of each firm to establish that 
firm's individual experience, the National Labor Office must 
collect data for a minimum of four years, before full experience- 
rating can begin.
The phase-in process could work as follows: every employer 
will pay a uniform tax rate for the first two years, e.g. 7 
percent. In the third year, the employer's individual tax will 
be based partially (possibly one-third) on the employer's 
reserve account balance and based partially (possibly two-thirds) 
on a somewhat lower uniform tax rate. In the fourth year, the 
employer's individual rate will be mostly based (possibly two- 
thirds) on the employer's reserve account, and less on the 
uniform rate (possibly one-third). Beginning in the fifth year, 
the employer becomes fully experienced-rated and with the 
employer's UI tax rate no longer dependent on any uniform tax.
B. Administrative Financing
1. Administrative Trust Fund
The Administrative Fund will be maintained by the National 
Labor Office for purposes of collecting the administrative tax 
and allocating the administrative resources to Voivod and Local 
Labor Offices.
The administration of the program will be controlled by the 
National Labor Office. However, most of the services provided 
will be administered at the local level. It is expected that the 
Local Labor Offices will offer evaluation, assessment, and 
counseling services. Another fundamental service provided will 
be reemployment services including job matching and referral to
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available job openings. All employers will be requested to list 
job openings will the Placement Service.
2. Funding Mechanism
The administrative system will be supported by a uniform 
employee tax of (approximately) 0.3% (three-tenths of one 
percent). The Administrative tax will be withheld by the 
employer from each employee's wages and forwarded to the National 
Labor Office at the same time as the employer's taxes are paid.
3. Administrative Resource Allocation
To administer the national program, twenty percent of the 
revenues from the Administrative tax will be allocated to the 
National Labor Office. Ten percent would be allocated to the 
Voivods and sixty percent of the administrative revenues will be 
distributed to the Local Labor Offices. The remaining ten 
percent would be held for contingency, Trust Fund Reserve, and 
special project purposes.
A portion of the funding for the National Labor Center 
should be used for research and demonstration reemployment 
projects. The distribution of administrative resources among 
Voivods and Local Labor Offices would depend primarily on two 
different factors: (1) local employment and unemployment levels, 
and (2) a guaranteed base level of services to be provided in 
every locality.
VI. Administration
A. Administrative Structure of the Organization
Administration of UI shall have four major parts: (1) the 
National Labor Office (NLO), (2) the Voivod Labor Offices (VLOs), 
(3) the Local Labor Offices (LLOs), and (4) Tri-partite Advisory 
Councils. Complete authority shall rest with the NLO which will 
work with the VLOs and LLOs to operate a system of UI to serve 
employers and members of the labor force. Tri-partite Advisory 
Councils shall be established at the national, voivod, and local 
levels to provide guidance and community contact for the labor 
offices.
B. Responsibilities of the Parts of the Organization 
1. National Labor Office Responsibilities
The National Labor Office (NLO) shall generally oversee the 
administration of benefit payments and tax collections for the UI 
program conducted by the Voivod Labor Offices (VLOs) in 
cooperation with the Local Labor Offices (LLOs). Specifically,
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the NLO shall be responsible for collection of employer and 
employee taxes, disbursement of funds collected through employer 
taxes to the Voivods to cover benefit payments, maintenance of 
individual employer records used to determine taxes, calculation 
of annual tax rates based on experience rating factors, 
encouragement of reemployment strategies and pilot or 
experimental evaluation projects, maintenance of centralized 
labor market and economic information, policy research, 
allocating administrative resources raised through the 0.3% 
employee tax and held in trust, and actual distribution of funds 
for administration to the Voivods. The NLO shall establish 
standards for administration of benefit payments and tax 
collections and shall monitor compliance with those standards. 
The NLO shall also work with the Social Insurance Tax Authority 
(ZUS), the Identity Records Agency (PESCL), and Disability 
Programs when collaboration holds the promise of improving the 
efficiency of the UI system or the reemployment prospects of UI 
beneficiaries.
2. Voivod Labor Office Responsibilities
Voivod Labor Offices (VLOs) shall be responsible for 
coordination of activities with the NLO and supervision and 
cooperation with Local Labor Offices (LLOs) in the voivod. The 
VLO shall also collect information for management, labor market 
information, and evaluation of program effects. The VLO shall be 
responsible to make regular required reports to the NLO on 
activities conducted through the LLOs in the voivod. The VLO 
shall work with LLOs in the voivod to encourage reemployment, 
effective job matching and referral to appropriate active labor 
market programs including: retraining, intervention works, public 
works, and self employment. The VLOs shall also cooperate with 
the Social Insurance Tax Authority (ZUS), the Identity Records 
Agency (PESCL), and Disability Programs when requested to by the 
NLO.
3. Local Labor Office Responsibilities
Local Labor Offices (LLOs) are the primary service providers 
who shall determine separation and continuing eligibility for 
benefits among UI claimants, make monthly UI benefit payments, 
and support efforts of beneficiaries to become reemployed. The 
LLOs shall work directly with employers and individuals to 
support an efficient Placement Service, provide counseling, 
assessment and referral to other programs including retraining, 
public works, intervention works, self employment. The LLOs 
shall prepare and submit required reports to the VLO and NLO, and 
work with other agencies such as the Social Insurance Tax 
Authority (ZUS), the Identity Records Agency (PESCL), and 
Disability Programs when requested to by the NLO or VLO. The 
LLOs are encouraged to make policy recommendations to the voivods
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to improve the efficiency of the UI program and reemployment of 
claimants.
4. Tripartite Advisory Councils
Tri-partite Advisory Councils comprised of equal 
representation from labor, business, and government shall be 
established at the national, voivod, and local levels to provide 
guidance and community contact for the labor offices. The 
advisory councils shall attempt to ensure that all objectives of 
UI are met, and that the best interests of all persons served by 
the system are served. Furthermore, the advisory councils shall 
help coordinate the activities of the UI system with other labor 
market programs including placement, retraining, intervention 
works, public works, and self employment; and with private 
employers and community based organizations.
C. Evaluation and Planning
Within the NLO there shall be a special division existing 
for the special purpose of doing ongoing research on efficiency 
and effects of the UI system and its coordination with other 
labor market and social programs. In all cases research shall be 
conducted with the aim of providing useful and practical 
information for improving the UI system.
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Part Pour
An Analysis of Proposed Rules for 
An Unemployment Insurance System for Poland
I. Objectives of Unemployment Insurance (UI)
A. Temporary partial wage replacement during periods of 
involuntary unemployment to reduce hardship.
UI payments should be temporary this is one distinction 
from social welfare payments and paid to persons with 
significant labor force attachment as a matter of right. 
Payments should not be means tested. UI payments should be 
adequate to provide for the most basic needs of recipients, but 
should only partially replace lost wages so as to maintain an 
incentive for return to work. UI should be paid only during 
periods when unemployment is unavoidable. Positive efforts to 
gain reemployment should be required during the period of 
compensation.
B. Minimize the duration of unemployment by promoting 
rapid and suitable reemployment.
The UI system should work in cooperation with the Placement 
Service, the employer community, and active labor market programs 
to minimize the duration of unemployment by promoting 
reemployment. Mechanisms to promote reemployment are included in 
the continuing eligibility provisions of UI.
C. Limit economic downturns by supporting consumer
purchasing power in the community and nation.
The UI system acts as an important built in stabilizer for 
the local and national economies. During periods of economic 
downturn, because the UI system partially replaces lost earnings, 
it acts to maintain the aggregate level of spending. During 
periods of economic expansion, as people return to work less will 
be paid out in benefits and spending from UI benefits will 
decline thereby partially preventing inflationary pressures.
D. Encourage stabilization of employment within 
enterprises.
By properly structuring the tax system used to fund benefit 
payments, incentives can be provided for employers to stabilize 
employment levels within enterprises. In simple terms, over time 
tax rates for contributions from employers who lay off a smaller 
percentage of their workers will be lower than otherwise. 
Setting tax rates in this way is referred to as "experience 
rating."
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II. Coverage
Coverage refers to jobs. People may gain eligibility for 
benefits by working in covered jobs. Universal coverage is the 
goal, but given the political and economic situation in Poland it 
may be possible to achieve this goal only gradually. The 
exclusions listed are minimal. A more detailed listing of work 
relationships covered may be developed within Poland based on 
culture and traditions. Detailed questions arise for example 
concerning: small farm employers, church employers, schools, 
hospitals, government jobs, domestic servants, railroad and 
maritime employees.
The system should not affect activity of family enterprises 
where income support problems are resolved internally, nor should 
it inhibit the establishment, operation, and growth of new or 
small enterprises or self employment.
III. Eligibility for Benefits
A. Monetary Eligibility: Required Work Experience
UI benefits should be payable only to persons with 
demonstrated attachment to the work force. Payments to new 
entrants, either recent students or others, may be made from 
social welfare funds, but there can be no actuarial basis for a 
solvent UI system which makes such payments. The formula in the 
proposed rules for a UI system is stated in terms of quarterly 
earnings, if it is more convenient for the information system the 
rules could be stated in terms of months.
B. Non-monetary Eligibility: Separation Issues
For unemployment to be an insurable risk it must be 
unavoidable, and not the result of personal actions. Without 
clear separation restrictions the well known insurance problems 
of "moral hazard" exist. However, regardless of the reasons for 
separation after some period of active job search, as verified by 
the Placement Service, continued unemployment cannot be judged to 
be caused by personal actions and should become compensable with 
payments being financed by a socialized rather than an experience 
rated tax. That is such benefit payments shall not be "charged 
back to a previous employer."
C. Initial Eligibility Determination
This describes the administrative process for initially 
establishing UI benefit eligibility at the local level.
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D. Continuing Eligibility Criteria
These conditions promote the reemployment aspect of UI. The 
rules recognize that reemployment must be in an appropriate job. 
The definition of appropriate job is broadened as the duration of 
unemployment lengthens.
There is another issue associated with continuing 
eligibility which is not covered in the proposed rules that is 
fraud. Fraud involves situations where claimants receive 
benefits after misrepresenting facts, or employers under-pay UI 
taxes after misrepresenting facts. More information about the 
legal system*is needed to make recommendations for dealing with 
fraud in the UI law. Clearly the law should call for repayment 
of excess benefit payments, or payment of delinquent taxes, but 
the question of financial and criminal penalties is open.
E. Employer and Claimant Appeals of Eligibility Decisions
This describes a process where initial eligibility decisions 
may be appealed by either claimants or previous employers. 
Employers may be more likely to appeal decisions in a system with 
experience rating of taxes. The three level system described 
should be adequate to resolve disputes. Making the decision of 
the third level final will keep UI issues out of the courts. 
However, this proposal may not be compatible with individual 
rights governed by Polish constitutional law, in which case the 
final avenue of appeal would involve the judicial system.
IV. Benefits
A. Monthly Benefit Amount
The formula for the monthly benefit amount (MBA) is designed 
to replace approximately half of lost wages between a specified 
maximum and minimum. In Poland there is a national average wage 
reported by the Central Statistical Agency (GUS) and computed on 
the basis of six major industries. Now in Poland there is a 
uniform MBA set at 28% of this national average. It may be the 
case that a flexible MBA will need to be introduced gradually.
To get the system started operating on a self financing 
basis it is reasonable that benefit levels be set rather low. As 
the system develops it may be possible to raise the fraction of 
lost earnings replaced by the monthly benefit (replacement rate), 
but it should be noted the impacts on UI taxes which will result. 
Although the formula recommended is based on quarterly wage 
information, an alternate system could be developed using the 
concept of the highest monthly wage.
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B. Mandatory Waiting Period
A waiting period is proposed as a means to cost share with 
claimants. It should have the added effect of reducing entry by 
claimants who could easily become reemployed quickly. The 
proposal includes payment of what amounts to one month of 
benefits for rapid reemployment. It should be treated as 
something of a "bonus" by the claimant and a socialized cost by 
the system.
C. Duration of Benefits
The maximum duration of benefits is set at the current 
maximum with an added limitation based on base period earnings 
that ensures only partial wage replacement.
D. Benefits for Partial Unemployment
A partial benefits system is proposed to provide an 
incentive for beneficiaries to work at least part time. This 
proposal is part of the answer to "black labor." Under this 
system claimants may work at low wages which if reported could 
contribute to future benefit eligibility, and at the same time 
receive compensation.
Not mentioned in the proposed rules for a UI law is 
provisions for "short time compensation" or "work sharing." 
These provisions, which are popular in Germany but not in the 
United States, involve using the UI system to make payments to 
workers who work in a firm where a substantial hours reduction 
for a significant number of workers has been instituted in an 
effort to avoid layoffs. If this is a desired feature of a UI 
law in Poland provisions may be added.
V. Financing
The proposed system for financing benefits includes 
experience rating because of the belief that experience rating UI 
taxes will lead to employer involvement in the system which will 
result in a more efficiently operating system. Experience-rating 
gives the individual employer direct control over their own 
unemployment costs by limiting the degree of subsidization of 
other employer's unemployment benefit costs. Simply put, the 
employer is responsible for their own unemployment benefit costs 
and not the costs of other employers.
Taxes for benefits will be collected from employers using a 
reserve ratio experience rating method. The draft law does not 
state it specifically but given that 40% of benefits are now paid 
for with a 3% tax on total wages, a system with rates which range 
from 1 to 9 percent, plus a 1 percent socialized component may be
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proposed. A 0.3% tax paid by workers to finance administration 
is proposed. This division of uses of the two tax revenue 
sources makes the users of the service also the payers and 
creates good incentives. Employers will seek to avoid lay offs 
and benefit charges. Workers will be less likely to abuse use of 
administrative services, and will expect a high level of 
performance from office staff when given service.
To complete the system of experience rating a formula or 
schedule must be developed to set tax rates based on employer 
reserve accounts which will yield sufficient tax. An example of 
a formula to determine the experience rated part of the UI tax 
rate for employer i, which is to be multiplied by total annual 
payroll of employer i to determine experience rated taxes, is:
t = r * ffs * p) - b)
Pi
where:
tj is the UI tax rate applicable in a give year for employer i,
r is the fraction of the deficit in the employer reserve account 
which is repaid each year, the same parameter is applied to 
all employers with UI covered jobs,
s is the fraction of the annual payroll which employers must keep 
in their UI employer reserve account, the same parameter is 
applied to all employers with UI covered jobs,
Pi is the annual payroll of employer i,
b; is the UI reserve account balance for employer i.
The larger r is the quicker employers recover their target 
UI employer reserve account balance after benefit charges, and 
vice versa. With r equal to 0.5 (or fifty percent) half of a 
deficit would be repaid in each year, this would partly avoid the 
type of procyclical affect (exaggerating swings in business 
cycles) which results under a system financed by a flat UI tax. 
The value of s should be set to yield a UI trust fund balance 
which would serve as a reasonable shield against future benefit 
charges. If the monthly benefit amount replaces half of lost 
earnings, a high level of unemployment is 10 percent, and the 
objective is to keep one year of benefits on reserve then s 
should be set at 0.05 (or five percent).
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Complete experience rating can operate best if no limits on 
the range of experience rated UI tax rates is imposed. However 
practical considerations suggest a maximum no higher than the 
social insurance tax rate.
Socialized benefit charges include all benefits paid to 
claimants who are disqualified for separation reasons but later 
regualify as stated in Section III.B of the proposed rules. 
Also included in socialized benefit charges are benefits paid to 
former employees of bankrupt or closed firms. Usually a 
socialized tax of 1 percent will cover these costs, however, a 
examination of records would be useful before the socialized rate 
is set.
The total UI tax rate for a covered employer would therefore 
be the sum of the experience rated part which is determined by a 
formula plus the flat socialized part.
Money collected by these taxes should be held in trust and 
invested very conservatively. The usual investment is government 
debt bonds. While a one year trust fund reserve is suggested 
above, the popular standard of trust fund adequacy is an amount 
large enough to pay benefits as a fraction of total payrolls 
experienced in a recent severe recession for at least 18 months. 
This is criterion is frequently referred to as having a high cost 
multiple of 1.5, since 18 months is 1.5 years. Of course 
removing this much financial capital from the private sector may 
in itself have a depressing effect on investment, so that a one 
year or even 9 month criterion may be adequate.
An alternative system would be a uniform or flat tax rate 
paid by all employers on their total payrolls. The flat tax 
might be revised each July based on claims experience and 
employer payrolls in the previous calendar year. A flat tax 
system can operate with a very small trust fund reserve. The 
real advantage of a flat tax system is simplicity and low 
administrative cost of operation no individual employer accounts 
are needed. The disadvantages are that the system tends to 
exaggerate business cycles rather than stabilize them as does an 
experience rating system where benefit payments are recovered 
from separating employers over several years. Another 
disadvantage of the flat rate system is that employers become 
detached from the system since they lose their ability to control 
UI tax costs by their personnel decisions.
A third type of financing system which includes elements of 
both experience rating and a flat tax is also possible. Since 
there are usually similar patterns of hiring and layoffs within 
given industry groups, for example construction, it may be 
possible after some study to form industry groups and apply the 
same flat tax to all firms in the same group, with tax rates 
varying across different industry groups. Some preliminary data
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on employment, unemployment, and wages by industry groups has 
been received, however, a consistent breakdown into comparable 
industry groups for these three concepts is needed to make a 
reasonable proposal for experience rating of UI taxes by industry 
group.
VI. Administration
The administrative structure with NLO, VLO, LLO, and tri 
partite councils is presumed to remain largely the same as 
described in Chapter 2 (articles 3 through 10) of the 1991 
Employment Law for Poland. Indeed much from those articles could 
be added to what is in the proposed rules for a UI system. A new 
component for evaluation and planning is proposed.
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Part Five
Alternative UI Benefit Financing Schemes 
I. Financing Background
A prime aim of the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social 
Policy in developing a UI system is to establish a financing 
mechanism independent of other labor and social programs. This 
part of the report on establishing new rules for a UI program 
reviews alternative financing plans.
In a market economy the level of unemployment fluctuates 
from year to year depending on business cycles. Therefore, to 
operate an independent financing system for UI benefits a trust 
fund must be established. Ideally, the balance in the trust fund 
would accumulate during business expansion, and be drawn down 
during times of rising unemployment. The UI system would tend 
toward solvency over the business cycle.
Currently a 3% tax is levied on total payrolls to fund 
employment programs. The tax is paid by employers. As seen in 
Table 1, taxes collected by this mechanism amount to only about 
44% of all benefits currently paid out in recent years. Benefit 
payments have averaged about 7% of total payrolls in recent 
years. Clearly, a self financing UI system requires a level of 
contribution higher than 3% of gross payrolls.
Increasing payroll taxes is not an easy matter in Poland. 
The social insurance contribution is already an onerous 45%. In 
actuality, this tax is not always paid now because of the 
financial difficulties faced by employers. Furthermore, there is 
a progressive income tax system with a minimum rate of 20%.
There is a widespread problem in Poland of "black market 
employment." In the United States this type of employment is 
said to be part of "the underground economy." Many people in 
Poland, including UI beneficiaries, have jobs on which they are 
paid cash under-the-table. While this phenomenon is probably 
more due to the 45% social insurance tax than the 3% employment 
tax, the Poles are interested in a UI law which recognizes this 
and attempts to deal with it.
Experience rating of UI taxes might encourage employers to 
increase their reporting of wages. Experience rating also 
presents a means of raising the average UI tax rate while 
offering each employer the possibility of lowering their own tax 
bill by reducing layoffs.
In the following, a variety of systems financing benefits 
are reviewed. The overview of financing systems presented below 
is followed by a series of simple simulations for a variety of
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different employer types. All of the examples and simulations 
assume that taxes for benefits will be paid by employers, and 
that taxes may range between 0 and 10%.
The alternatives described in this section concern the 
financing of benefits. The proposal made in Part Four, Section 
V.B.2 concerning financing of administration still stands. A 
0.3% tax paid by workers to finance administration was proposed 
in Part Four, Section V.B. 2.
This division of tax revenue sources makes the users of the 
service also the payers, and creates good incentives. Because of 
experience rated taxes on employers to finance benefits, 
employers will seek to avoid layoffs and benefit charges. And 
because workers pay for the administration of UI benefits they 
will be less likely to abuse the use of administrative services, 
and will demand a high level of performance from office staff 
when given service.
II. Possible Methods of Financing Benefits
In the following subsection A, we discuss approaches to UI 
taxation based on the principle of experience rating. By this 
principle, an employer's UI tax rate rises with increased benefit 
payments to past employees. Subsection B presents examples of UI 
tax systems which do not base an employer's tax on prior UI 
benefit payments to former employees.
The reserve ratio is a summary measure of all past benefit 
and tax payments, the benefit ratio on the other hand has a 
memory limited to 3, 4, or 5 years depending on the 
specification. So, that for employers at the maximum tax rate 
the benefit ratio method may "forget" some past benefit charges 
while the reserve ratio method never will forget.
The reserve ratio method can easily incorporate a target 
reserve or "precautionary" balance concept, which allows benefit 
charges to be repaid over the course of the business cycle. In 
principle, reserves can be built up when unemployment is low and 
drawn down when unemployment is high. The benefit ratio system, 
on the other hand only smooths the recovery of benefit charges by 
basing the tax rate on the average of charges over the past few 
years.
A. Experience Rated Financing Systems
There are two basic types of experience rated UI tax 
systems: reserve ratio and benefit ratio. The reserve ratio type 
requires that a complete history of tax payments and benefit 
charges be maintained for each employer. The benefit ratio type 
uses only recent benefit and payroll records. In this section we
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first describe reserve ratio systems, we then review benefit 
ratio systems. The examples presented in this section assume 
that the maximum UI tax rate is set at 10%. Given that recent 
benefit payouts have approximated 7% of total payrolls, the range 
of 0% to 10% may provide a reasonable first approximation to a 
self financing system. Particularly, if recommendations in this 
proposal to eliminate welfare aspects and separate financing from 
active labor programs are adopted.
For all of the experience rating cases, an employer is 
required to have a minimum of two calendar years of experience 
with employees. The new employer tax rate, n, applies in the 
first two years. The new employer tax rate should be set to 
cover expected costs, but should not be so high as to hinder the 
formation of new legitimate businesses. In the third and 
subsequent years of operating a business with employees, one of 
the experience rating formulae may be applied.
1. Reserve Ratio UI Tax Systems
Reserve ratio UI tax systems involve the following elements: 
tj is the UI tax rate applicable in a given year for employer i, 
bj is the UI employer reserve account balance for employer i. 
Pi is the annual payroll of employer i, 
n is the new employer tax rate,
s is the fraction of the annual payroll which employers must keep 
in their UI employer reserve account, the same parameter is 
applied to all employers with UI covered jobs,
r is the fraction of the deficit in the employer reserve account 
which is repaid each year, the same parameter is applied to 
all employers with UI covered jobs, and
z is the tax covering socialized UI benefits which are paid to 
former employees of bankrupt firms or to claimants who re- 
qualify after serving a denial period for a UI 
disqualification based on a separation issue.
a. A simple reserve ratio tax system:
The simple reserve ratio for an experience rated UI tax is:
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where, the reserve account balance for employer i, bj, is the 
accumulated excess of UI tax contributions beyond benefit 
charges, and PJ is the employers total payroll in the computation 
period, which may be the calendar year preceding the tax year. 
To accommodate delays in reporting, the computation period may be 
the twelve month period ending two calendar quarters before the 
tax year. Unless there is a target level of trust fund reserves, 
reserve ratio taxes will only be payable when the reserve ratio 
is negative.
In a simple reserve ratio system an employer's UI tax rate 
can be determined by a formula like:
if bj >= 0; tj = 0
if bj < 0; t; = min{0.10, (-bj/pj) }
By this formula the tax rate would range between 0 and 10% 
depending on the employer's reserve ratio.
b. A reserve ratio tax system with a trust fund balance target 
for employers
Adding a trust fund balance target to a simple reserve ratio 
system involves including another term in the numerator of the 
reserve ratio. In this case the target trust fund balance, s*pif 
is added to the tax formula.
The formula for a reserve ratio UI tax system with a trust 
fund balance target for employers is:
if S*PJ <= b{ ; tj = 0 
if s*Pi > bi; t, = min{0.!0, [
Again, by this formula the tax would range between 0% and 
10% depending on the employers reserve ratio.
c. A reserve ratio tax system with a trust fund balance target 
and a reduced rate of repayment
Since the level of unemployment varies cyclically, it is 
possible that the UI system can act as a built in stabilizer. 
One dimension of this is that benefit payments increase as 
unemployment rises. An experience rating tax system can be 
refined to reinforce the counter cyclical nature of UI by slowing 
the repayment of benefit charges by employers, so as not to raise 
employment costs at the very time business finds it hardest to 
keep operating. Naturally, in an environment with very high
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levels of price inflation, repaying benefit charges even a year 
later softens the tax burden on an employer as repayment is made 
with cheaper dollars. Nonetheless, this section reviews a 
mechanism for spreading the tax burden over time even in an 
environment of price stability.
Starting with a reserve ratio system with a target trust 
fund balance, an additional scalar multiplier, r, is added. The 
formula for a reserve ratio UI tax system with a trust fund 
balance target and a reduced rate of repayment is:
if s*pi <= b4 ; tj = 
if s*Pi > bi; tj - min{0.10, r*l
This factor will diminish the rate of repayment when 0 < r < 1. 
A similar formulation with, 1 < r, could be used to adjust 
repayments upward in the presence of inflation.
d. A reserve ratio tax system with a trust fund balance target, 
a reduced rate of repayment, and a socialized component
The basic principle of experience rating is that UI benefit 
payments are charged back to previous employers. However, it 
must be recognized that in some cases benefit payments may not be 
reasonably assigned to previous employers. The two most 
important instances are when an employer goes out of business and 
when a claimant becomes eligible for benefits after being 
initially denied due to the circumstances of separation from a 
particular employer. After a certain period of time, 
unemployment is no longer the fault of the prior employer, but 
rather is due to general conditions in the labor market.
Starting with a reserve ratio system with a target trust 
fund balance and an additional scalar multiplier to reduce the 
rate of repayment, we may add a factor, z, to recover socialized 
costs of UI benefit payments. The resulting UI tax formula is:
tj = max{z, min{0.10, z + r*[ ( (s*pj) -b.) /p,] } }
In usual practice, UI tax contributions for the socialized 
component of the tax £o not contribute to an employer's reserve 
account. In the formula provided the maximum tax rate has not 
been increased, the range of possible rates is now 1% to 10%. 
There is nine percentage points of variation possible due to 
experience rating.
e. Simulations of reserve ratio UI tax systems
Table 2 presents simulations of UI taxes for an experience 
rated reserve ratio UI tax. The simulations assume a
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hypothetical employer in Poland who has an annual payroll of 
750,000 zl. For example, 100 employees earning an average of 625 
zl. per month over the course of a calendar year. The table 
contains 10 blocks of 4 rows. Each separate block assumes a 
different initial UI reserve balance for the employer.
Within each block, the first row assumes no reserve target, 
full repayment immediately (up to the ceiling on the tax rate), 
and a zero socialized tax component. The second row assumes a 
positive reserve target, full repayment in the first year (up to 
the ceiling on the tax rate), and a zero socialized tax 
component. The third row assumes a positive reserve target, one- 
half repayment in the first year (up to the ceiling on the tax 
rate), and a zero socialized tax component. The fourth row 
assumes a positive reserve target, one-half repayment in the 
first year (up to the ceiling on the tax rate), and a 1% 
socialized tax component.
Among the ten blocks, the first two assume positive levels 
of reserves at 15,000 zl. and 2,250. The third block assumes 
zero initial reserves. These are followed by 7 increasingly 
negative reserve levels -17,500, -50,000, -95,000, -115,000, 
-125,000, -135,000, and -195,000. These reserve balance levels 
were selected to illustrate the responsiveness of the tax system 
in the 0 to 10% range.
The first block assumes a positive reserve balance of 
15,000 zl. which is 2% of the assumed annual payroll of 750,000. 
With a reserve target of 0 or 5% no taxes are paid unless a 
socialized tax is imposed. The 1% reserve target means there is 
a surplus of 7,500 on reserve. A 1% socialized tax will generate 
7,500 in contributions over the year, this is true for all 
simulations presented in Table 2.
In the second block in Table 2, a positive reserve balance 
of 2,250 or 0.3% of the annual payroll is assumed. With a zero 
reserve target, no tax is payable. With a 5% target, there is a 
5,250 reserve deficiency. Reserves will be funded at the target 
level in one year with a tax rate of 0.7% which will yield 5,250 
in contributions. A tax rate of 0.35% will replenish half of the 
reserve deficiency in one year. The socialized tax of 1% is 
additive on top of the reserve ratio tax.
The third block a zero reserve balance is assumed. With a 
zero reserve target, no tax is payable. With a 5% target, there 
is a 37,500 reserve deficiency. Reserves will be funded at the 
target level in one year with a tax rate of 5% which will yield 
37,500 in contributions. A tax rate of 2.5% will replenish half 
of the target reserve deficiency in one year. The socialized tax 
of 1% is additive on top of the reserve ratio tax.
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A reserve balance of -17,500 is assumed in the fourth block 
of Table 2. A tax of 2.33% would bring the employer's reserves 
to a zero balance in one year. If the reserve target is 5%, then 
a tax of 7.33% would bring reserves to the fully funded 37,500 
level in one year. Half the reserve deficiency would be made up 
in one year with a tax of 3.67% on total payroll. As in all the 
simulations on Table 2, the socialized tax of 1% is additive on 
top of the reserve ratio tax.
In a simple reserve ratio system, a reserve balance of 
-95,000 as given in the fifth block results in a maximum tax rate 
of 10%, with the reserve deficiency only partially made up in the 
first year. The 10% tax is levied regardless of whether or not 
there is a target reserve balance. If the aim is to recover only 
half the deficiency in the first year a tax of 8.83% will be 
levied. An extra percentage point is added if a socialized tax 
is imposed.
In the final block on Table 2, a -195,000 reserve balance is 
assumed. This amounts to over 25% of annual payroll. Regardless 
of the variations in the reserve ratio tax formula a 10% UI tax 
is imposed under the system illustrated in Table 2. Given that 
the maximum rate is 10%, with a reserve target of 1% and a 
minimum payback speed of 50% per year, the maximum rate will 
always be charged when the deficit exceeds 20% of payrolls.
The workings of the reserve ratio system of UI taxation is 
further illustrated by tax rate simulations presented in Tables 
3-6 and Figures 1-4. In each of the tables and figures it is 
assumed that an employer has an annual payroll of 750,000. The 
simulations examine how alternative systems work as the employers 
UI reserve balance ranges from -25% of payroll to 10% of payroll. 
The four sets of simulations correspond to each of the four rows 
in the separate blocks of Table 2.
The first simulation presented in Table 3 and Figure 1 
assumes no reserve target, full repayment immediately (up to the 
10% ceiling on the tax rate), and a zero socialized tax 
component. From the graph and figure the simple workings of this 
system can be easily seen. When the trust fund balance is -10% 
of payroll or less the UI tax rate is 10%. When the trust fund 
balance is above zero, the UI tax rate is zero. When the trust 
fund balance is between -10% and zero, the UI tax rate is the 
negative of the trust fund balance. Problems with this system 
are that in equilibrium reserves are zero there is no reserve to 
provide for uncertain events, also because benefit payments are 
recovered too guickly it may de-stabilize the aggregate economy, 
finally it ignores the fact that some benefit charges may not be 
attributed to a particular employer and some business go out of 
business.
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The second simulation presented in Table 4 and Figure 2 
assumes a positive reserve target, full repayment in the first 
year (up to the 10% ceiling on the tax rate), and a zero 
socialized tax component. By adding a positive reserve target of 
5% of payrolls, employers with reserves less than or equal to -5% 
will pay the maximum rate of 10%, and employers must have a 
reserve at least equal to 5% before a zero tax applies. Between 
the minimum and the maximum tax rates (0, 10%) the tax is the 
target minus the reserve ratio. For example: .05 - .04 = .01, 
and .05 - (-.03) = .08.
The third simulation presented in Table 5 and Figure 3 
assumes a positive reserve target, one-half repayment in the 
first year (up to the 10% ceiling on the tax rate), and a zero 
socialized tax component. By cutting the speed of repayment in 
half, employers with reserves less than or equal to -15% will pay 
the maximum rate of 10%, and because of the reserve target 
employers must have a reserve at least equal to 5% before a zero 
tax applies. Between the minimum and the maximum tax rates (0, 
10%) the tax is one-half the target minus the reserve ratio. For 
example: .5*(.05 - .04) = .005, and .5*(.05 - (-.03)) = .04.
The fourth simulation presented in Table 6 and Figure 4 
assumes a positive reserve target, one-half repayment in the 
first year (up to the 10% ceiling on the tax rate), and a 1% 
socialized tax component. By adding the socialized tax, 
employers with reserves less than or equal to -13% of payroll 
will pay the maximum rate. With the socialized tax, employers 
with reserves at or above the 5% of payrolls target will pay the 
minimum tax which equals the socialized tax of 1% on payrolls.
The parameters selected for the above simulations were 
chosen because of the financing demands required by the system of 
unemployment compensation currently operating in Poland. If 
benefit schedules or eligibility rules are modified, the levels 
of taxes applied must be revised accordingly.
2. Benefit Ratio UI Tax Systems
Benefit ratio UI tax systems involve the following elements: 
tj is the UI tax rate applicable in a given year for employer i,
ut is UI benefits paid to an employer's former employees in year 
t.
UT is UI benefits paid to an employer's former employees in years 
T-l, T-2, and T-3, i.e. UT = UT.J + uT_2 + uT_3 ,
pt is the employer's total payroll in year t, 
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PT is an employer's total annual payroll in years T-l, T-2, and 
T-3, i.e. UT = UT.J + uT_2 + uT.3/
n is the new employer tax rate,
z is the tax covering socialized UI benefits which are paid to 
former employees of bankrupt firms or to claimants who re- 
qualify after serving a denial period for a UI 
disqualification based on a separation issue.
a. A simple benefit ratio tax system:
The simple benefit ratio formula for an experience rated UI 
tax is:
ti = UT/PT/
this formula will operate between the maximum and minimum rates 
which are set and will be positive when ever UT is positive.
This formula assumes that the benefit ratio is based on 
three years of employer experience with payrolls and benefit 
payments. Each year may be a calendar year or some other 
convenient 12 month period. In the United States it is popular 
to designate the 12 month period ending June 30 of a particular 
year to be the "computation period" for the subsequent tax year. 
This provides sufficient time for gathering data to set tax 
rates.
Besides three year benefit ratios, four and five year 
benefit ratios are also used in the United States. The more 
years involved in the benefit ratio the slower the payback. For 
example, a three year benefit ratio implicitly has a "speed of 
payback" parameter, like the reserve ratio parameter, r, 
discussed above equivalent to r = 0.33. A four year benefit 
ratio has an implicit payback speed of 0.25, and a five year 
benefit ratio has an implicit speed of 0.20.
The main distinction between the operation of the reserve 
ratio and the benefit ratio formulas is that the reserve ratio 
never "forgets" benefit charges while the reserve ratio does. 
For employers with high benefit charges, who are paying the 
maximum rate, some benefit charges may pass out of the reserve 
ratio before they are recovered within 3, 4, or 5 years. Thus 
the benefit ratio, is a more imperfect approach to experience 
rating UI taxes.
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b. A benefit ratio tax system with a socialized component:
A socialized component can be easily added to the simple 
benefit ratio formula for an experience rated UI tax:
tj = UT/PT + z
As in the simple case described above this formula will operate 
between the maximum and minimum rates. It will have a minimum 
value of z. The tax rate will exceed z whenever UT is positive.
c. Simulations of benefit ratio UI tax systems
Tables 7 through 10 present simulations of UI taxes for an 
experience rated benefit ratio UI tax. The simulations assume a 
hypothetical employer in Poland who has an annual payroll of 
750,000 zl. For example, 100 employees earning an average of 625 
zl. per month over the course of a calendar year. It is assumed 
that the minimum tax rate is 0 and maximum tax rate is 10%. The 
simulations also assume that the benefit ratio formula involve 
three years of payroll and benefit charges.
Each of the Tables 7 to 10 contains 6 blocks of 5 rows. 
Within each of the tables:
The first block assumes benefit charges only in the first of 
the three years.
The second block assumes benefit charges only in the second 
of the three years.
The third block assumes benefit charges only in the third of 
the three years.
The fourth block assumes benefit charges only in the first 
and second of the three years.
The fifth block assumes benefit charges only in the second 
and third of the three years.
The sixth block assumes benefit charges in all three years 
the three years.
To most completely expose the workings of the benefit ratio 
system, each of the annual benefit charges examined on a 
particular table are identical. The level of benefit charges 
considered increases steadily from Table 7 through 10, with the 
levels being: 3%, 5%, 10%, and 15% of total payroll respectively. 
This range is sufficient to illustrate the working of a benefit 
ratio system with minimum and maximum rates of 0 and 10%.
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Also, within each block the first three rows apply to the 
three years in the benefit ratio, the fourth row computes the tax 
rate and tax payment without a socialized tax, and the fifth row 
computes a tax payment including a socialized tax of 1%.
Considering the first three blocks in Table 7, we see that a 
one time benefit charge equal to 3% of payrolls which appears 
first in year 1 of the benefit ratio, then in year 2, then in 
year 3, results in a 1% annual tax rate, in the absence of a 
socialized tax. All benefit payments are repaid in three years 
since the tax rate is always below the maximum of 10%. Complete 
payback also occurs if two consecutive years of benefits are 
charged at a rate of 3% of payroll. This can be seen by adding 
the tax payments in the first, the fourth, the fifth, and the 
third blocks in Table 7 which amount to 45,000 the sum of two 
years benefit charges at 22,500. The last block in the table 
shows that if 3% of payrolls is charged in benefits each year, a 
steady state is reached where benefit charges equal tax payments 
in each year.
Simulations in Table 8 work in a way exactly similar to 
those in Table 7 with benefit charges at the level of 5%. In 
Table 9 with benefit charges at the level of 10% of payrolls, all 
benefit charges are recovered by the tax system provided that 
benefit charges at the 10% of payroll level occur no more often 
than in two successive years. When benefit charges are 10% of 
payrolls every year, the system will just recover benefit charges 
only if there is no socialized tax.
With benefit charges at 15% of payrolls, one year of benefit 
charges results in a tax rate of 5% ignoring the socialized tax, 
and two years of charges at 15% of payrolls results in a tax of 
10% the maximum. This can recover all benefit charges only if 
there is no socialized tax. The final block in Table 10 clearly 
illustrates the case where, due to a maximum on tax rates, some 
benefit charges are not recovered from past employers. When this 
happens employers with high benefit charges are subsidized by 
employers paying the socialized tax, or by contributions from 
governmental general revenues.
Earlier it was mentioned that the UI tax should include a 
component to recover payments to two categories of beneficiaries, 
we now have a third category due to tax ceilings in reserve ratio 
systems. The three instances are: (1) former employees of 
businesses which no longer exist, (2) beneficiaries who qualify 
after serving a disqualification due to a separation issue, and 
(3) benefits which cannot be effectively charged to employers due 
to ceilings on tax rates.
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B. Non-experience Rated UI Financing systems
Non-experience rated or fully socialized systems for 
financing UI are reviewed in this section by considering the 
particulars of financing in three countries: Hungary, Germany, 
and Canada. While all three countries apply tax rates to 
employers and workers the notable difference concerns what 
earnings are taxable. In the above simulations for Poland, it 
was assumed that total payroll was taxable. This is in fact the 
case in Hungary. However, Germany and Canada, as well as the 
United States and other countries have an upper limit on earnings 
by an individual which are subject to taxation for UI.
Hungary, like Poland, only recently instituted a real UI 
system. Poland, like Hungary, can be expected to continue to 
have all earnings taxable. This is a preferred situation for at 
least two reasons. First, placing a ceiling on earnings which 
are taxable results in discrimination against hiring low wage 
workers. For example with a ceiling on the taxable wage base at 
10,000 per year, the UI taxes on two workers earning 10,000 would 
be the same as on one worker earning 20,000. Furthermore, with 
experience rating, the responsiveness of the experience rating 
schedule is diminished with an earnings ceiling.
To describe the UI tax systems in Hungary, Germany, and 
Canada the following symbols are used:
te is the UI tax rate applicable in a given year for an employer, 
tw is the UI tax rate applicable in a given year for a worker,
Bt_, is the total of UI benefits paid in the previous year to all 
claimants in the country
Ptot is an average employer's total payroll in year t-l,
Pto is an average employer's taxable total payroll in year t-l,
1. The Hungarian Model
In Hungary P^ = P^ since all wages are taxable for 
unemployment insurance. In practice, the UI tax rate is set and 
revised by discretion of the national Parliament. In principle 
the tax is set to cover to cover benefit costs. Currently the 
rate paid by workers is 2.0% of all wages, and the rate paid by 
employers is 7.0% of all wages. In recent years the revenue 
collected by the UI tax amounted to 0.09*Ptol which was sufficient 
to pay all UI benefits plus the cost of some active measures. 
The Hungarian system, at the present time, does not operate on a 
trust fund basis.
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2. The German Model
In Germany there is a limit on taxable wages set at 
DM 46,667 in the west, and DM 21,589 in the east in 1994. The 
same tax rate is paid by employers and workers so that each group 
pays half of UI benefit costs. The tax rate is set to cover the 
previous year's benefit charges, in 1994 the rate was set at 
3.15% of taxable payrolls. In symbolic terms:
tc = tw , and 
2*t6 = 2*tw = (te + tw ) - B^/P^.
3. The Canadian Model
In Canada there is a limit on taxable wages set at $C 27,990 
in 1994. Each year Human Resources Development Canada must set 
employer and worker UI tax premiums to generate revenues 
sufficient to meet current program costs, reduce any past surplus 
or deficit, and anticipate future economic conditions. From time 
to time the Minister of Finance may fix the premium rate. In any 
event, the employer UI tax rate is 1.4 times the worker UI tax 
rate.
In equilibrium the UI tax rate would be such that:
tc = 1.4*tw , and
2.4*tw = BM /Ptax
The UI tax system in Canada results in workers paying 42% of the 
cost of UI benefits while employers pay 52% of the cost.
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Table 1. UI Financing in Poland, 1990-94
Year Benefit Total UI Tax UI Tax Benefits/ Revenue/ 
Payments Payroll Rate Revenue Payroll Benefits
1990 1891.0 54520 0.02 1090.4 0.035 0.577
1991 11115.0 207150 0.02 4143.0 0.054 0.373
1992 19697.0 310405 0.02 6208.1 0.063 0.315
1993 26771.0 394680 0.03 11840.4 0.068 0.442
1994 37246.5 542960 0.03 16288.8 0.069 0.437
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Table 3. Reserve Ratio UI Tax Simulation
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Table 4. Reserve Ratio UI Tax Simulation
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Figure 2
Reserve Ratio Ul Tax
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Table 5. Reserve Ratio UI Tax Simulation
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Figure 3
Reserve Ratio Ul Tax
Target = .5. Speed = .5. Social Tax = 0
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Table 6. Reserve Ratio UI Tax Simulation
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Table 7. Benefit Ratio UI Tax Simulations,
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Table 8. Benefit Ratio UI Tax Simulations,
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Table 9. Benefit Ratio UI Tax Simulations,
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Table 10. Benefit Ratio UI Tax Simulations,
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